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(Part I of this article begins on page one of Volume Four.)
IV.
SOME ELEMENTARY

PROBLEMS CONCERNING PRESUMPTIONS.

A. Rebutting the Thayer Presumption.

TAKING AGAIN OUR CLASSIC CASE premised

on an accident

involving a master's delivery truck being driven by X, a servant,' 5'
we saw that a presumption of agency was created. That is, in a tort
action against the master, if plaintiff can introduce evidence from
which the trier of fact can find that X at the time of the accident was
driving a truck owned by the master, plaintiff has survived the risk
of not producing evidence of the Basic Fact, A. Further, if both sides
rest at this moment and the trier of fact does find the Basic Fact, A,
to be more probably than not true, then the trier of fact must, as a
matter of law, also find that X was acting within the scope of his
authority. This latter conclusion is the Presumed Fact, B. Thus plaintiff's case reads 7r W "Yes A" (- A A B.
The option then passes to defendant to rest, hoping that plaintiff
has not persuaded the trier of fact that the Basic Fact is more probably
than not true. Alternatively, defendant may seek to introduce evidence
from which the trier of fact might infer the negative of the Basic Fact.
The last, and most likely, course of conduct is that defendant will
seek to rebut the presumption by introducing "some" evidence contra
the Presumed Fact. If this last course is taken, then under the classic
151. See text pages 15-18 supra.

(475)
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giver, to decide whether
practice, it becomes a question for the law
152
rebutted.
been
or not the presumption has
Hitherto, we have assumed that when defendant introduced
"some" evidence contra the Presumed Fact, the law giver will rule
that the presumption is thereby dissolved, and, unless there is other
evidence on the record tending toward the same result, plaintiff will
suffer a directed verdict or nonsuit. The mechanics of the Thayer
presumption have, therefore, been delineated as follows:
7r

W "Yes A" (- AAB

But if: ZAW "No-B" - no-B
A B.
Then: 7r W "Yes A" ('
This analysis, for the novice, is true; but it must be observed
that analytically it is only true so far. This is so, unfortunately, because another factor must be interpolated into the equation; that is,
how much evidence must be introduced by defendant to rebut the
presumption? So far we have been content to say "some," but now
that term must be defined with adequate particularity.
It is to be observed that plaintiff had the burden of introducing
"some" evidence of A; that is, plaintiff ran the risk of non-production
of evidence of the Basic Fact. Here, however, it must be noted that
there is evidence, and then again, there is evidence. Thus, a vital
question of degree remains to be dealt with, but since semantic evolution plays a significant part in this problem, a page of history is in
order.
It is common knowledge that originally the jury was made up
of the witnesses to the event giving rise to the litigation, and that it
was only at the end of a slow, evolutionary process that the idea of
the jury as a neutral trier of fact became conceptualized.' l" From this
metamorphosis, two significant developments followed. First, in order
to regulate what information the jury ought to use in deciding a par54
ticular controversy, the law of evidence began to be articulated.
152. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
153. This is a greatly oversimplified general proposition but it will suffice for now.
See 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (1926 ed.) ; THAYER, TREATISE
47-182.
154. THAYER, TREATISE 180-81: "But the greatest and most remarkable offshoot
of the jury was that body of excluding rules which chiefly constitute the English
"Law of Evidence." If we imagine what would have happened if the petit jury had
kept up the older methods of procedure, as the grand jury in criminal cases did, and
does at the present day,-if, instead of hearing witnesses publicly, under the eye of
the judge, it had heard them privately and without any judicial supervision, it is easy
to see that our law of evidence never would have taken shape; we should still be
summing it all up, as Henry Finch did at the beginning of the seventeenth century,
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Secondly, it followed that if the jury was to decide cases on the basis
of evidence introduced through witnesses in accordance with certain
rules called the "Law of Evidence", 5 then the jury ought to function
only if there was evidence presented upon which it could premise its
deliberations. Thus, the rule was enunciated that a verdict would
be directed against a plaintiff by the law giver if plaintiff did not come
forward with proof. 5
In its early stages, however, the principle that plaintiff, upon
whom the burden of persuasion rested, ought to come forward with
proof required only that plaintiff introduce "some" proof in the sense
of "any" evidence. Whether evidence had in fact been introduced
was the only question for the law giver, since sufficiency of evidence
was always a question for the trier of fact to determine. 5 In short,
this was the "scintilla" rule. The difficulty with this rule, however,
was that "any" 1"' evidence was not always "enough" evidence to
support a verdict for the party having the burden of persuasion, so
that the law giver often had to submit a case to the jury knowing
full well that a verdict for the proponent would be set aside.' 59
L'evidence al jurie est quecunque chose que serve le partie a prover l'issue per luy.
This it is,-this judicial oversight and control of the process of introducing evidence
to the jury, that gave our system birth; and he who would understand it must keep
this fact constantly in mind."

155. GILES, THa CRIMINAL LAW 123 (1954): "The law of evidence is a manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation. Without it the courts would be swamped with
a mass of irrelevancies and hopelessly prejudiced by non sequiturs. Regarded broadly

it is a golden treasury of restrictive practices. It hedges round the testimony which
a court may hear, limiting it to what is immediately relevant to the issue in dispute
and allowing evidence to be given only by those best qualified to give it-that is, with
some exceptions, to those who can say they have seen something, heard something,
tasted something, felt something, or smelt something which will assist the court in
coming to a decision."
156. This has been traced back to the year 1725. See Syderbottom v. Smith, 1

Strange 649, 93 Eng. Rep. 759 (K.B. 1725). See also Company of Carpenters v.

Hayward, 1 Douglas 374, 99 Eng. Rep. 241 (K.B. 1780). Smith, The Powcr of the
Judge to Direct a Verdict; Section 457-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, 24
CoLum. L. Rzv. 111 (1924).
157. Richardson v. City of Boston, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 263, 268-269 (1856): "As
it is the duty of the jury to decide the facts, the sufficiency of evidence to prove those
facts must necessarily be within their province . . . . If there be 'no evidence whatever,' as in the case of Parks v. Ross, (11 How., 393) to prove the averments of the
declaration, it is the duty of the court to give such peremptory instruction. But if
there be some evidence tending to support the averment, its value must be submitted
to the jury with proper instructions from the court. If this were not so, the court
might usurp the decision of facts altogether, and make the verdict but an echo of
their opinions."
158. Any evidence means any relevant evidence, which, after all, may not carry
anyone very far along the road to forming a belief about issue B.
MODEL CODE op EvDXNcE rule 1 (12) (1942):
"Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove any material matter and includes opinion evidence and hearsay evidence."
UNIFORM RULES oF EVIDNcg rule 1 (2) (1953):
"Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove any material fact."
159. Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, 443 (1897) : "In the Courts of this and other
states the rule is that if the party having the burden of proof offers a mere scintilla
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The last half of the nineteenth century saw yet another step
taken in this evolutionary process when a new rule was articulated
whereby plaintiff's risk of non-production was sharply increased. This
change was accomplished simply by interpreting "some" not merely
as "any" but as "enough" to support a verdict for plaintiff. In Pennsylvania, for example, the new rule was announced with a flourish:

"Since the scintilla doctrine has been exploded, both in
England and in this country, the preliminary question of law
for the court is, not whether there is literally no evidence, or a
mere scintilla, but whether there is any that ought reasonably
to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established." x"o

Thus, upon a proper motion at the close of plaintiff's case the law
giver must answer the question posited in the form espoused by Dean
Wigmore:
"Are there facts in evidence which if unanswered would
justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the question which the plaintiff is bound to maintain ?" '
of evidence to support each necessary element of his case, however overwhelming the
evidence to the contrary, the Court must submit the issue thus made to the jury, with
the power to set aside the verdict, if found against the weight of the evidence."
160. Hyatt v. Johnson, 91 Pa. 196, 200 (1879). Compare Thomas v. Thomas, 21
Pa. 315 (1853) ; Fitzwater v. Stout, 16 Pa. 22 (1851). Accord, Dauphin Improvement
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871): "Formerly it was held that if
there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound
to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more
reasonable rule: that, in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a
preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but
whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the
party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." This new rule can be
traced back to Justice Williams in Toomey v. London Ry. Co., 3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 150,
140 Eng. Rep. 694, 696 (C.P. 1857) : "It is not enough to say that there was some
evidence; for, every person who has had any experience in courts of justice knows
very well that a case of this sort against a railway company could be submitted to a
jury with one result. A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there may have
been negligence on the part of the defendants, clearly would not justify the judge in
leaving the case to the jury: there must be evidence upon which they might reasonably
and properly conclude that there was negligence."
161. 9 WIGMOR4, EvIDENCE § 2494 at 299 (3d ed. 1940). See also WIGMORt,
EviENCE § 448 (1) (Stud. ed. 1935). This test which plaintiff must surmount has
aptly been termed a "rigorous practice." See note 80 supra. It is quite obvious, of
course, that the tendency for the past two hundred years has been to narrow the area
in which the jury qua trier of fact operates as a judicial mechanism. Not only does the
law giver direct a verdict against plaintiff in the event that not enough evidence is introduced to warrant jury deliberations, the law giver can often direct a verdict ior
plaintiff in the instance of "overwhelming" evidence which no reasonable jury could
help but believe. But see Savidge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 Pa. 205, 110 A.2d
730 (1955) ; Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Sur. Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 Atl. 523 (1932).
Not only has a floor and a ceiling been constructed to mark off the area of jury
dominion, the growing remittitur and additur practice promises to wall in the scope of
its powers even in those cases which do properly get to the jury.
This trend has not gone unnoticed by its critics. For instance, see Howe, Juries
as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. Rxv. 582, 615 (1939) : "Such a reversal of
opinion, if it were isolated, might have little significance, but when many other courts
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An analogous problem arises when the law giver must decide
whether a presumption has been rebutted by defendant's evidence contra
the Presumed Fact. Here again we have assumed that the presumption dissolved as a matter of law whenever "some" evidence no-B was
introduced; but does this "some" mean "any" or "enough" evidence
no-B ? Again the codifiers are now in agreement that the latter definition is correct:
". [W]here the basic fact of a presumption has been established

in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be assumed
unless and until evidence has been introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence." 162
". [T]he presumption does not exist when evidence is intro-

duced which could support a finding of the non-existence of the
presumed fact . . ." 163
B. Conflicting Presumptions.
There also exists in rare cases the possibility that presumptions
will operate in favor of both parties to an action at law. For example,
Turner v. Williams' saw a suit brought against the administrator
of a woman for money had and received to the use of plaintiff's
testator. Plaintiff based his cause of action on allegations that the
woman had, through fraud, induced testator to marry her by falsely
representing that she was divorced from her previous husband, and,
after the second marriage, had induced testator to procure life insurance
in her favor. The case turned on the question of the validity of the
throughout the country are found to be making the same shift . . . there is revealed
one aspect of that basic conflict in the legal history of America-the conflict between
the people's aspiration for democratic government, and the judiciary's desire for the
orderly supervision of public affairs by judges." While Professor Howe was attacking
the constriction of the jury's function on the criminal side, Mr. Justice Black observed
the same trend on the civil side. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 404
(1942) (dissenting opinion) : "The rule that a case must go to the jury unless there
was 'no evidence' was completely repudiated in Schuylkill v. Dauphin Improvement
Co. . . . upon which the Court today relies in part. There the Court declared that
'some' evidence was not enough-there must be evidence sufficiently persuasive to the
judge so that he thinks 'a jury can properly proceed.' The traditional rule was given
an ugly name, the 'scintilla rule,' to hasten its demise .... The same transition from
jury supremacy to jury subordination through judicial decisions took place in the State
courts." (Emphasis added.)
Concomitantly with the increased rigor of the test applied to plaintiff at the close
of his case, some states developed the practice of granting compulsory non-suits instead.
The compulsory non-suit in this sense was unknown at common law, but the courts
preferred it over the directed verdict because the non-suit did not prevent bringing
another action. The trend today, however, is toward making the distinction mcre
formal than real.
162. MOD9I. CODE op EvIDENcn rule 704 (1) (1943).
163. UNTFORm RULES Op EVIDENCn rule 14 (1953).
164. 202 Mass. 500,89 N.E. 110 (1909).
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second marriage and whether or not the woman had in fact obtained
a divorce from her first spouse.
There was no direct evidence of a divorce, but there was evidence
that the woman had been living with her first husband shortly before
her second marriage. On the one hand, therefore, there existed a
presumption that the first marriage had continued intact; while on
the other hand, there was a presumption that the woman was innocent
of bigamy; that is, had obtained a divorce. Faced with presumptions
leading to contradictory presumed facts, the court had either to choose
one presumption in preference to the other or to proceed on the theory
that the conflicting presumptions rebutted each other. The court chose
the latter alternative.
"There is no 'sacramental force' in the presumption of innocence
over the presumption of the continuance of life or any other status
in its nature likely to endure. Presumptions are rules of convenience based upon experience or public policy, and established
to facilitate the ascertainment of truth in the trials of causes.
There are a few instances of conclusive presumptions; but, where
there are conflicting presumptions, one is not as matter of law
stronger or weaker than another. The whole case then is thrown
open to be decided as a fact upon all the evidence. It is for the
sound judgment of the jury to weigh all the circumstances, including the characters of the persons involved and the probability of different lines of conduct, and determine where the truth
lies as a matter of common sense unfettered by any arbitrary
rule." 165

Thus it is that there is authority for the view that conflicting
presumptions destroy one another and the existence or nonexistence
of the presumed fact must be determined exactly as if no presumption
had ever been applicable in the action. 6 ' Unfortunately, it has been
165. 202 Mass. 500, 505, 89 N.E. 110, 112 (1909).
166. MOD4L CODE OF EVID.NCe rule 704, Illustration 2 (1943) : "In proceedings
to recover compensation for the death of a deceased workman, W, claimant A establishes the fact that she went through a ceremonial marriage with W in May, 1930, and
lived with him until 1936, and claimant B establishes the fact that she went through
a ceremonial marriage with W in June, 1938. The fact established by A raised a
presumption of the validity of the 1930 marriage and a presumption of continuance
of the marital status between A and W. The fact established by B would ordinarily
raise a presumption of the validity of the 1938 marriage. The presumed fact of continuance of the marital status is inconsistent with the presumed fact of validity of the
second marriage. Therefore, the issue is to be determined exactly as if neither presumption were ever applicable in the action."
See also Denning, Presumptions and Burdens, 61 L.Q. Rev. 379, 383 (1945):
"For instance, when a man has gone through a ceremony of marriage with three
women and is charged with bigamy in marrying the third during the life of the
second, there may be a presumption of innocence on the occasion of the second marriage so as to presume its validity . . .which may conflict with a presumption in
favor of the duration of the life of the first woman .... Any nice discussion on con-
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asserted that the prevailing American practice is to weigh the con67
flicting presumptions and rule that the stronger destroys the weaker.
Despite Thayer's objection that this practice of weighing conflicting
presumptions is "exotic, ill adapted to an English or North American
climate," 1' the cases illustrate that it is common practice. Thus, faced
with a choice between a presumption that certain public officials had
done their duty and a presumption that a voter had obeyed the law,
one court concluded:
"These two presumptions are incompatible: both cannot
stand. It is more charitable to suppose that the moderators have
made a mistake than that the voters have done some act by which
they have incurred the penalty of temporary disfranchisement.
We think the presumption in favor of the voter must prevail." 169
This points up the interesting possibility that if this view is followed
to its logical extreme, then a list of presumptions in order of strength
might be created from the strongest down to the most insignificant.
flicting presumptions is foreign to English law. The preferable approach in such a

case would be to recognize that the presumptions are provisional presumptions only
which can and should be discarded when they conflict, leaving the issue to be determined by the jury on the facts, the legal burden being in the last resort decisive."
See also: Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L.
Rzv. 906, 916-19 (1931). The most colorful expression of this rule was stated in
Yarnel v. Kansas City, Ft. Scott & M.R. Co., 113 Mo. 570, 579, 21 S.W. 1, 3 (1893),
when the court observed that "one presumption rebuts and neutralizes the other, like
the conjunction of an acid and alkali." Wigmore, in turn, aptly refers to the whole
topic as one wrought with "vain speculation and logical unrealism."

WIGMORE,

EvIDXNcE 454 (Stud. ed. 1935).
167. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLtMS Olt EVIDtNcz 36 (2d ed. 1957): "But most of
the decisions determine which of the conflicting presumptions has the stronger
reason back of it, and treat that presumption as if it stood alone in the action."
168. THAYXR, TREATIsg 343.
169. Phelan v. Walsh, 62 Conn. 260, 291, 25 Atl. 1, 4 (1892). See Donovan v.
Security-First Nat'l. Bank, 67 Cal. App.2d 845, 155 P.2d 856 (1945), Hunter
v. Hunter, 111 Cal. 261, 43 Pac. 756 (1896); Sillart v. Standard Screen Co., 119
N.J.L. 143, 194 Atl. 787 (1937). Also see cases collected in Morgan, Some
Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. Rzv. 906, 932, note 41 (1931).
In the same note Professor Morgan takes a stand in favor of the anti-Thayer
view. In turn, Professor Chafee suggested that rather than weigh the relative
strengths of the conflicting presumptions one ought instead look at the "logical

core" inherent in each one. Chafee, Developments in the Law-Evidence-1932, 46
HARv. L. Rev. 1138, 1143 (1933) ; Progress of the Law, 1919-21, Evidence, 35 HARV.

L. Rev. 303, 315 (1922). Wigmore, on the other hand, attempted to treat several
presumptions as "successive" rather than as conflicting. 9 WIcMoRt, EVlDENCS
§ 2492 (3d ed. 1940) : "Presumptions are sometimes spoken of as 'conflicting.' But, in
the sense above examined, presumptions do not conflict. The evidentiary facts,
free from any rule of law as to the duty of producing evidence, may tend to
opposite inferences, which may be said to conflict. But the rule of law which
prescribes this duty of production either is or is not at a given time upon a given
party. . . . There may be successive shiftings of duty, by means of presumptions
successively invoked by each; but it is not the one presumption that overturns the
other, for the mere introduction of sufficient evidence would have the same effect
in stopping the operation of the presumption as a rule of law. This shifting of the
duty of production of evidence, by reason of the successive invocation of different
presumptions, may create a complicated situation difficult to work out; but it can
more properly be spoken of as a case of successive presumptions than of conflicting
presumptions .
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As has already been pointed out, the article on Evidence in Corpus
Juris Secundum lists 113 presumptions,' a fact which might give
some insight into the esoteric exercise in abstruse categorization which
beckons some future pedant. 7'

V.
A PROLEGOMENON To A THEORY OF PRESUMPTIONS.
A. Statement of the Problem.
Thus far we have assumed the existence of presumptions and
we have described how they work in the abstract, that is, we have
been satisfied with mechanistic and descriptive analysis. We have
not thus far, however, attempted to illustrate with adequate particularity the relationship between these particular mechanisms and the
warp and woof of the law at large. Therefore, the problem remains
as to whether a consistent theory of presumptions can be articulated
which will integrate the presumption as a mechanism into an appropriate position in the juristic system.
Thayer, for example, saw presumptions as a many-splendored
abstract thing:
"Presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation,
which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some
170. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MIcH.
L. Rtv. 195 (1953).
171. The proposed draft of the MISSOURI CoDE ov EVIDENC4, 1948, attempted this
very thing.

"Section 406.

CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS.

a. When conflicting presumptions of equal weight arise in relation to the
same matter neither presumption shall be recognized.
b. When one presumption is stronger than a contrary presumption the stronger
presumption shall prevail as for example, but not exclusively, (1) the presumption of innocence shall prevail over all conflicting presumptions; (2) the
presumption of legality of a last marriage shall prevail over any contrary
presumptions that would tend to support the legality of the prior marriage;
(3) a presumption of death of a person absent from home or from the state
for seven years without being heard from shall prevail over the presumption
of the continuance of a prior status,-life; and (4) the presumption of legitimacy
of children shall prevail over the presumption of continuance of a prior
marriage.
COMMENTS
In many cases conflicting presumptions of equal weight arise with regard
to the same issue. In such situations the one presumption rebuts and neutralizes
the other presumption, leaving the parties to their proof. The four situations
recited in paragraph b. supra, are examples where one presumption is stronger
than contrary presumptions, and are examples where such stronger presumptions
prevail."
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 15 (1953) takes the same approach. It adopts
the idea that when there are apparently conflicting presumptions the trial judge must
apply the one "founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic," but, if
there is "no such preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded."
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given inquiry. They may be grounded on general experience, or
probability of any kind; or merely on policy and convenience. On
whatever basis they rest, they operate in advance of argument
or evidence, or irrespective of it, by taking something for granted;
by assuming its existence. When the term is legitimately applied
it designates a rule or proposition which still leaves open to further inquiry the matter thus assumed. The exact scope and
operation of these prima facie assumptions are to cast upon the
party against whom they operate, the duty of going forward,
in argument or evidence, on the particular point to which they
relate. They are thus closely related to the subject of judicial
notice; for they furnish the basis of many of those spontaneous
recognitions of particular facts or conditions Which make up that
doctrine. Presumptions are not in themselves either argument or
evidence, although for the time being they accomplish the result
of both. It would be as true, and no more so, to say that an
instance of judicial notice is evidence, as to say that a presumption is evidence. Presumption, assumption, taking for granted,
are simply so many names for an act or process which aids and
shortens inquiry and argument. These terms relate to the whole
field of argument, whenever and by whomsoever conducted; and
also to the whole field of the law, insofar as it has been shaped.
or is being shaped by processes of reasoning. That is to say, the
subject now in hand is one of universal application in the law,
both as regards the subjects to which it relates and the persons
who apply it." 172
Wigmore, on the other hand, while adopting Thayer's explanation of the mechanism of presumptions, was content to take a functional approach and explain the mechanism in terms of the burden
of proof.17 3 Alternatively, Judge Maxey suggested a rationale for
the creation of presumptions and a division of presumptions into functional categories:
"Presumptions arise as follows: They are either (1) a procedural
expedient, or (2) a rule of proof production based upon the
comparative availability of material evidence to the respective
parties, or (3) a conclusion firmly based upon the generally
known results of wide human experience, or (4) a combination
of (1) and (3). The presumption as to the survivorship of husband and wife meeting death in a common disaster is a procedural
expedient. It is not based on extensive data arising from human
experience. An unexplained absence for seven years raises the
presumption of death of the absentee upon the expiration of the
last day of the period. This also is a procedural expedient-an
arbitrary but necessary rule for the solution of problems arising
172. THAYZR, TREATISE 314-15.
173. 9 WIGMORP, EVID4NCE §§ 2483-2540 (3d ed. 1940).
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from unexplained absences of human beings. An example of
(2) is the rule requiring persons on trial for doing certain acts
which are illegal if done without a license to produce evidence
that they belong to the class privileged by license..

.

. The fol-

lowing are examples of (3) : (a) an envelope properly addressed
and stamped will reach the addressee if the latter is alive; (b) a
child born during the wedlock of its parents is legitimate; (c) a
person who drives across a railroad crossing will show due care.
...A presumption that a debt is paid after a lapse of a definite
long period of time is both a procedural expedient (1) and a
conclusion based on the results of wide human experience (3)." 174
All of these theories may be true so far, but whether a presumption is regarded as an universal intellectual solvent or as a mere procedural expedient, the relationship between presumptions and the judicial process taken as a whole remains to be explained. Thus, it is
suggested, that the presumption concept fits into several entirely different interstices in the judicial framework and that, chameleon-like,
the concept of presumption adopts a different connotation with each
setting.

17 5

B. Presumptionsand the JudicialProcess.
1. Law-Making Tool.
It has now become common knowledge
includes the authority to make law, that is,
norms. 17 6 But in less sophisticated times the
admit that it exercised a legislative function

that the judicial power
to articulate decisional
judiciary was loathe to
and, instead, purported

174. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 504-05, 173 At. 644, 648 (1934).
175. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 183 (1947):
... This word presumption has suffered badly from rough and careless handling.
It has been used as a synonym for inference and sometimes as the operative part
of weaselworded formulae for saying that from the judicial or legislative point
of view certain things are taken as so and attempts to contradict them will be futile."
See: MORGAN,

MAGUIRE

AND WEINSTEIN,

CASES AND MATERIALS

ON EvIDENCE

440-43 (4th ed. 1957) ; Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L.
Rzv. 324, 324-31 (1952) ;Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions,

52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 195-209 (1953).

176. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921); "I take judgemade law as one of the existing realities of life."
See: FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 33-41 (6th ed. 1949) ; RODELL, WoE
UNTO You, LAWYERS 45-70 (2d ed. 1957). Also Mr. Justice Black in Francis v.
Southern Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 445, (1942) : "It should be noted at the outset that tort

law has been fashioned largely by judges, too largely according to the ideas of
many. But if judges make rules of law, it would seem that they should keep their
minds open in order to exercise a continuing and helpful supervision over the
manner in which their laws serve the public. Experience might prove that a
rule created by judges should never have been created at all, or that their rule
though originally sound, had become wholly unsuited to new physical and social
conditions developed by a dynamic society. A revaluation of social and economic
interests affected by the rule might reveal the unwisdom of its expansion or imperatively require its revision or abandonnent."
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to apply existent "law" discovered by reason operating upon experience.'7 The judges, however, did claim the power to promulgate
rules of procedure and evidence to expedite the trial as a rational
process. As has already been observed, however, the judges could
make new law by manipulating presumptions. 7 In this sense, therefore, presumptions are not concerned with the problem of proof, but
rather, are part of a now outmoded myth.

2. Judge-Made Rules of Law.
Alternatively, a great many decisional norms promulgated by
the common law judges have retained their disguise and have never
been flatly articulated as rules of substantive law. Thus, the presumption of consideration behind a sealed instrument means that a seal
is good consideration.1 9 Again, while it is often said that a child
under seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a
felony, what is meant is that such a child cannot be lawfully convicted
of a felony.18 0 Properly speaking, such pseudo-procedural aphorisms,
disguising rules of substantive law, have nothing to do with the subject of presumptions.'"

3.

Tool of Reason.

It has often been observed that the doctrine of judicial notice is
subject to abuse when an appellate tribunal invokes it to justify an
a priori conclusion. 8 2 As some practicing lawyers can attest, this
177. See, for example, CARTER, LAW, ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1908).
178. See text supra at note 70. Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 155
(1917) : "The expression 'conclusive presumption' might be taken to be a term used
solely in the statement of a rule (a statement of principle) in the law of evidence,
and not concerned with rules of substantive law. Even if, however, its application
is thus limited, its use would be open to criticism. But the expression 'conclusive
presumption' is used today as a clumsy and roundabout method of stating a rule of
substantive law; or rather, as giving a fiction reason for a rule of substantive law."
179. See text supra at page 14.

180. See

MORGAN,

BASIC PROBLEMS

or

EVIDENCE

30 (2d ed. 1957).

181. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L.
Rtv. 195, 198-99 (1953) : "That the so-called 'conclusive' or 'irrebuttable presumptions'
are really not different from rules of substantive law is well known and recognized
by innumerable judicial decisions. Such 'presumptions' serve the same general purpose in our law as fictions. By expressing what are in reality rules of law in the
form of rules of evidence, the courts have a method by which the law can change
its content without ostensibly announcing new rules." Alternatively, canons of
statutory construction are often couched in terms of presumptions, as, for example, the presumption that the Legislature does not intend a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution, or unreasonable. See Altrere v. Allentown Officers' &
Employees' Retirement Bd., 368 Pa. 176, 182, 81 A.2d 884, 887 (1951').
182. MORGAN, SOME PRO13LEMS OF PRoor 67-68 (1956): "Judicial notice may be
a dangerous device in the hands of a judge who is opinionated or conceited or who
inadvertently assumes the non-existence of pertinent data. . . . There are decisions
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use of judicial notice leads at times to astounding absurdities, such
as the judicial observation of the "fact" that boys are better swimmers
And, as Thayer equated presumptions with judicial
than girls.'
notice as mechanisms used in trials to effect proof, without themselves being proof,'8 4 , so, too, presumptions are subject to the same use.
But the assertion that this is an inexcusable abuse may, to a certain
extent, overlook the realities of the existent situation in which the
jurist writing an opinion finds himself. The "law" used to decide a
case is one thing, but the "law" articulated in an opinion is something
else again. The published opinion must appear obvious and absolute
in order to have force: it must order and arrange the material if it
is to satisfy man's craving for the rational." 5 Thus, the opinion must
have a foundation in facts upon which the appropriate legal maxims
can be built to support the opinion's conclusion in some kind of ordered
rationality. Rare indeed, however, is the perfect record where even
minor facts are explicitly made certain. Rarer indeed is the opinion
in which intermediate propositions are not necessary and for which
some justification is present. Thus, in these instances, the invocation
of presumptions serves to shore up the foundations of an otherwise
unsatisfactory intellectual edifice.
For instance, if a statute is involved in an opinion, the jurist
is not content to use as his basic premise the simple assertion "The
statute is." He must give life to the statute within the context of
the system: he must make the statute cognizable within the dialectic
of the local jurisprudence. Thus, the law giver judicially notices the
domestic law, thereby bringing the statute within the case, and then
he is forced by the system to apply it since it controls him. This is
so because this statute must by law be known to the law giver, and,
once known, it is "presumed to be constitutional." It is not, therefore,
of the United States Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional legislation designed
to change long accepted legal concepts because the Court or a majority of its members deemed to be incontrovertibly true what many informed people and some later
courts believed to be demonstrably false."
183. De Simone v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 137, 142, 110 A.2d 431, 433 (1955).
184. THAYER, TREATISE 314-15. Quoted supra at note 172. Although both
judicial notice and presumptions are mechanisms effecting proof without themselves
being proof, this is the only similarity between them. See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF
PROOv 59-60 (1956): "It will be observed that Thayer says 'taking judicial notice
of a fact is merely presuming it.' . . . -Practitioners can be thankful that the courts
have not as yet beclouded the law of judicial notice by treating it as a part of the
law of presumptions. Thayer does not even mention it in his essay on 'Presumptions,'
though he speaks of a presumption and of judicial notice, each in its place, as a
prima facie assumption. And it is to be fervently hoped that the courts will not
enmesh the problems of judicial notice in the language of presumptions."
185. NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 5 (1938):
"Law must appear as natural, obvious, and absolute in order to have force with
which to impose itself upon those whom it would govern."
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fnerely an existent norm, it is a compulsive and vibrant one impressed
on the judge and the litigants by the system.' 8
Alternatively, assume that at common law plaintiff sued defendant railroad company alleging that he was a fireman on one of defendant's locomotives, that during a stop he had alighted momentarily
from the cab to put out the kerosene headlamp, that he began to climb
aboard again, and that at this instant the engine house steps broke,
causing him to fall and be injured. Defendant offered proof that
maintenance of the engine cab steps was within the province of the
engineer. The trial judge charged the jury, inter alia, that plaintiff
could not recover if the engineer was a fellow servant.""
The appellate court reversed, as well it might, because the charge
did not allocate the burden of persuasion as to the fellow servant doctrine. Was the onus on plaintiff to prove the engineer was not a fellow
servant, or was the onus on defendant to prove that he was? In any
event, the court decided that the burden rested upon plaintiff. The
court then proffered the reasons why the "law" dictated this choice.
First, the trial judge could not invoke judicial notice to solve the
problem; that is, the relationship between a locomotive engineer and
fireman was a question of fact. But this only supported the conclusion
that the burden of proof rested on the parties, but it did not explain
the choice as between the parties. This the court did by invoking the
principle that the burden ought to rest on plaintiff because a presumption existed that two employees of the same employer working together in close proximity are fellow servants.18 The "presumption,"
however, is not an operative one, that is a true presumption, simply
because it operates against the party having the burden of proof. This
presumption merely is a symbol representing the fact that the burden
of proof is upon plaintiff. Thus, the rationale of the case is that the
burden of proof is on plaintiff because the burden of proof (symbolized by the presumption) is upon plaintiff! It is manifest, therefore,
that this "rationale" is nothing more than an example of judicial hyperbole interpolated into the opinion to support an a priori conclusion
fixing the burden of proof upon plaintiff.
186. For an outline of the intellectual frame of reference within which lawyers
operate see Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. Rgv. 269, 269-72 (1944).
187. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 63 Ark. 477, 39 S.W. 358
(1897).
188. 63 Ark. 477, 39 S.W. 358, 359-60: "Upon the plaintiff devolved the burden
of proving his cause of action. The fireman and engineer were in the common service
of the defendant, working together to a common purpose, in the same department,
as shown by the evidence. The presumption is they were fellow servants; and it
devolved upon the plaintiff to show that they were not. . . . This court cannot
take judicial notice of the supremacy or subordination of one to the other, if any
exist."
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That this is not a true presumption, but instead is an example
of "the fallacy of the misplaced presumption," is illustrated by an
analogous situation which occurred in Massachusetts. There the
legislature was guilty of the same fallacy when it promulgated a presumption of due care, to-wit, that in all actions to recover damages
for causing the death of a person, the person killed shall be presumed
to have been in the exercise of due care and contributory negligence
shall be an affirmative defense to be answered and proved by the defendant."' 9 Thus, here the converse situation was created, with the
burden of proof resting on defendant and a "presumption" aiding
plaintiff.
But, it must be inquired, is it not rather redundant to give a party
the benefit of a presumption when the burden of proof is put on the
other party? If the defendant does not introduce some evidence of
contributory negligence, this fact alone will keep him from the jury
on that issue and will result in an appropriate finding as a matter of
law. Alternatively, once he introduces some evidence, the presumption is no longer a relevant factor in the case. Thus, Judge Lummus"9 '
extrapolated a cogent appraisal of this kind of "presumption":
"Indeed, a presumption, using the word in its proper and
technical sense, can have no operative effect unless it assists the
party having the burden of proof." 191
"A presumption is a rule of law which compels the conclusion
that a fact exists, in the absence of some required quantity of
evidence or degree of proof to the contrary. It is impossible to
weigh a rule of law, or to attribute to it persuasive force as evidence of fact ....

A presumption can have no greater effect than

to control unless rebutted by proof to the contrary. When the
statute cast upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence contributory negligence on part of the
plaintiff, it did everything for plaintiff that a presumption of his
good care could do. .

.

. The statutory presumption of due care

is like a handkerchief thrown over something covered by a blanket
also.... We are dealing with a so-called presumption which has

no operative effect and only a verbal or theoretical existence,
and a discussion of the working of genuine presumptions would
be superfluous." 192
189. MASs. GJtN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1932): "In all actions, civil and criminal,

to recover damages for injuries to the person or property or for causing the death
of a person, the person injured or killed shall be presumed to have been in the
exercise of due care, and contributory negligence on his part shall be an affirmative
defense to be set up in the answer and proved by the defendant."
190. See text supra at notes 136, 146.
191. Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 58 N.E. 2d 135, 139

(1944).

192. Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189 N.E. 41, 43-44 (1934) (concurring opinion). But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Horne, 338 P.2d 1067 (N.M. 1957).
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Again, Patterson v. Prior""' affords an excellent example of the
use of presumptions to perfect a record. There plaintiff had been
unlawfully imprisoned and during his imprisonment he had done labor
for defendant, the lessee of the state prison. Upon his discharge under
habeas corpus, plaintiff sued defendant for the value of his services.
The case was disposed of in the trial court upon an agreed statement
of facts, judgment was entered for plaintiff and defendant moved for
a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The basic issue in the case was simple enough: that is, whether
on these facts plaintiff could recover for unjust enrichment. Having
concluded that the answer was "yes", however, the appellate court
was faced with the problem of justifying the conclusion within the
context of the existent law.
While the result was eminently just, the court could not at the
time have relied on any rule of restitution to justify its holding since
that branch of the law was, and still is, in the process of being renThe court, therefore, had to make rational its
dered articulate.'
conclusion within the context of the existent rules of law. In order
to do this, it had to decide whether plaintiff had a cause of action in
assumpsit in the first place. It rested its justification for an affirmative
answer upon the accepted axiom that plaintiff had the right to waive
a tort and sue in assumpsit. But this in turn raised the question
whether a tort had been committed to bring into operation the option;
and, inferentially, if tort is premised upon the notion of fault, whether
defendant had wronged plaintiff. The answer to this, however, was
elementary if defendant knew that plaintiff had been unjustly imprisoned and defendant helped to keep him there. While this fact
did not appear in the agreed statement of facts in the record," 5 the
court solved the "problem of the missing fact" by invoking the presumption that defendant knew the law! Thus, the agreed statement
of the facts provided a sufficient basis upon which to rule as a matter
193. Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 440 (1862).
194. See Carlston, Restitution-A Search for a Philosophy, 6 J. LEGAL EDUc. 330

(1954).
195. The agreed statement of facts consisted of the following: "It is agreed
inthis case that the plaintiff, said James Prior, was imprisoned in the state prison,
in the custody of said Miller, as warden thereof, under and by virtue of a judgment
of the court of common pleas of Vanderburgh County, a certified copy of which
judgment is filed with defendant's answer. That during his confinement he did work
and labor as a criminal; said work and labor were of the value of $225; said
Patterson during all the time of the said Prior's confinement in said state prison was
the lessee thereof, and said work and labor were done by the order of said Miller,
and said Patterson received all the benefit of said labor as such lessee. The time
of said Prior's confinement commenced on the 12th of September, 1853, and he was
discharged therefrom, and ordered to be returned to the sheriff of Vanderburgh
County upon a writ of habeus corpus sued out on the first day of January, 1855."
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of law in the appellate court that defendant knew plaintiff had been
falsely imprisoned. This unique metamorphosis simply required the
solemn invocation of the magic talisman "Ignorance of the Law is
No Excuse" and, presto, the facts appeared.
Having decided that plaintiff could sue in assumpsit, the court
then had to determine whether the facts made out such a cause of
action. As its major premise the court cited the principle that when
labor was performed for the benefit of X and X knew or consented
to its performance, then X was liable to pay for the work upon an
implied promise. This axiom, in turn, however, raised the problem
whether defendant was cognizant that plaintiff was performing these
services. Rather than infer it from the agreed facts, which would mean
performing a function of the trier of fact in a trial court, the court
presumed it: that is, it implicitly created a "presumption" that a lessee
of a state prison farm knows that his prisoners are working for his
benefit.
Thus, the court arrived at the correct result without deviating
from accepted legal norms. But in order to rationalize the invocation
of those norms as decisional norms, the appropriate facts invoking
their application had to be found in the record. Where the record
was lacking, a presumption was pressed into service to create facts
as a matter of law. To some extent, therefore, a presumption is not
a mechanism regulating proof production, but an inference drawn by
an appellate court to justify the imposition of legal maxims rationally
required to support a legal conclusion without violating the axiom
that fact finding is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact.
4. Societal Myth.
In criminal cases there is a presumption of innocence. If this
were really a "presumption", it again would serve no purpose, since
the burden of persuasion is upon the shoulders of the prosecution. In
fact, it is not a presumption at all, but a method of fixing an accepted
state of mind, that is, of orienting the trier of fact to its duty. In
effect, it is a way of saying that the trier of fact ought not to draw
any unfavorable inference from the mere fact that defendant is on trial
in the first place.' 96 Alternatively, this same presumption is also just
196. While sitting on the Superior Court in Massachusetts Judge Lummus
once refused to give a ruling that the defendant in a homicide case was presumed
to be innocent. Instead he charged the jury, inter alia, that "The fact that a person
is in custody, or is charged with a crime . . .is not even the slightest evidence of
his guilt, and is not to create any prejudice or unfavorable impression against him
in your minds .... As I have already told you, in a criminal case the Common-
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another way of saying that the burden of proof is on the State in
criminal cases. In this sense, it is clearly redundant,"' but, nonetheless,
it is a typical mode of legal expression. 9 '
5. An Assumption.
At the trial the parties introduce facts into evidence according
to certain rules of procedure and evidence enforced by the law giver,
and upon the basis of these facts, the trier of fact arrives at a certain
degree of belief in favor of one party or the other, thus resolving the
dispute. In order to keep the size of the case under control, however,
policy dictates that as many facts as possible be taken for granted in
order to narrow the range of dispute. Procedure operates to this end:
facts alleged but not denied are taken to be true. Evidence operates
to this end: all but relevant facts having a tendency to prove a material issue are excluded. And, lastly, presumptions operate to this
same end while the trial of an issue of fact is in progress: even within
the area of factual dispute as delineated by the pleadings, as many facts
as possible are taken to be true.
In Scott v. Wilmeroth Service and Cold Storage Co.,' 99 for example, plaintiff was a grower who stored his apples in defendant's
wealth has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt,
in order to convict him." It goes without saying that Judge Lummus was reversed.
Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 151 N.E. 297 (1926). See the instructions to be read to the jury proposed by Professor McBaine in Burden of Proof:
Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 20 (1954): "The court instructs the jury that
the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime which he is charged to have
committed. You are instructed that the fact that an indictment has been returned
against the defendant . . . is not the slightest evidence of his guilt and must not
create any prejudice or furnish any unfavorable inference against him." See also
McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALin. L. REv. 242, 264 note 39

(1944).

9 WIrMORP, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940) : "But this term has been the subject
of two special fallacies, namely, 1, that it is a genuine addition to the number of
presumptions, and, 2, that it is per se evidence."
197. WIGMORP, EVIDENCE § 457 (Stud. ed. 1935): "For all crimes it used
to be said that there is a presumption of innocence. But most courts now recognize
that this is merely the equivalent of the settled rule that a crime must be proved
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." (This statement reflects a slightly
over-optimistic mood at the time on the part of its author.)

198.

FRANK, LAW AND

'riE

MODERN MIND

181 (6th ed. 1949): "What a crop

of subsidiary semi-myths and mythical practices the jury system yields! Time and
money and lives are consumed in debating the precise words which the judge may
address to the jury, although everyone who stops to see and think knows that these
words might as well be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all the jury's
understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language. Yet, every day, cases
which have taken weeks to try are reversed by upper courts because a phrase or a
sentence, meaningless to the jury, has been included in or omitted from the judge's
charge." WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 447 (1) (Stud. ed. 1935) : "These definitions serve
as an arsenal from which the unscrupulous defense practitioner often selects, in
order either to confuse the jurors into a state of skepticism of all proof or to trick
the trial judge into refusing a definition which has in some earlier precedent been
condemned."
199. 159 Wash. 77, 292 Pac. 99 (1930).
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warehouse. X came to defendant and offered to buy ten carloads of
apples at $2.50 a box on the spot. Not having any apples of its own
on hand, defendant wired plaintiff about the offer and plaintiff wired
back authorization to accept it. But then X and defendant entered
into a contract making provision for credit. X, however, defaulted
after the apples were loaded aboard the boxcars: at this moment plaintiff demanded the return of his apples but defendant refused. Instead,
purporting to act under the contract with X, defendant shipped off
the apples to auction where sale realized a sum far less than $2.50 a box.
Plaintiff sued defendant alleging that he had been damaged by
defendant's refusal to return the apples upon demand and the case
was tried on the rather narrow issue as to whether defendant had exceeded its authority in extending credit to X. In any event, the jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded plaintiff the difference
between $2.50 a box and the money realized by defendant at auction,
which defendant had already turned over to plaintiff. It was then
that defendant appealed arguing that there was no proof that $2.50
was the market price of the apples at the time of the demand and
refusal and, therefore, no proof that plaintiff had actually been damaged by defendant's refusal to let plaintiff peddle his own apples. The
court, however, answered the appellant's argument with dispatch:
"There is no evidence that the appellant contracted to sell them
above the going market price, and no evidence that there had
been any marked decrease in the going market price at the time
the owners themselves sought the opportunity to sell them. The
presumption is that prices of commodities remain stationary until
the contrary is shown, and we cannot think that the recovery
was in excess of that permissible under the evidence." 200
Thus, the case was disposed of on the basis that (1) there was
an implicit presumption that the defendant-X sale was pegged at the
market price and (2) a further explicit one that the market price remained the same until plaintiff tried to intervene to sell his own apples.
Ergo, the jury applied the correct measure of damages!
Thus, the jury believed that the original contract called for $2.50
and from this inferred that $2.50 was the market price at the time
of the conversion. As a matter of inference piled upon inference
commingled with several dubious assumptions, this might not have
been enough evidence upon which the jury could as a matter of simple
200. 159 Wash. 77, 292 Pac. 99, 101 (1930).
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fact finding, premise its conclusion. 20 ' The conclusion required the
belief that $2.50 was the contract price, the assumption that the parties
to a bargain always arrive at a price at the market price, the inference
from this that $2.50 was that price, followed by the assumption that
the market price was not subject to rapid fluctuation, and the final inference that the market value at the time of the conversion was therefore $2.50. By treating the assumptions as presumptions arising upon
proof that the contract price was $2.50, the Court ratified the jury's
conclusion and gave the jury's assumptions the force of law.
Thus, on the one hand, there are presumptions which are mechanisms used to modify the burden of proof at trial of an issue of fact
for reasons of policy. On the other hand, there are assumptions, that
is, general propositions of common knowledge which are treated as
presumptions in order to affirm a conclusion or belief premised upon
otherwise insufficient relevant evidence. The difficulty is that every
principle of reason applied by a jury in reaching a conclusion, if that
conclusion is upheld by an appellate court, can become another "presumption", making that term synonymous with the sum total of man's
working hypotheses and assumptions. In turn, the mass of assumptions listed as "presumptions" in the lawbooks makes a definition of
actual presumptions used at trial nearly impossible.
6. True Presumptions.
Taking again our classic example of the master's vehicle we
saw upon the introduction of some evidence that there was an accident involving a vehicle owned by a master, driven at the time by his
servant, that a presumption arose which, standing by itself, compelled
the finding that the servant was acting at the time within the scope
of his authority. 20 2 Thus, the proponent of the master's liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior is relieved of the onus of actually
proving agency: if the trier of fact finds the basic fact to be true more
probably than not, then a "proof mechanism" will credit the proponent
201. Had the court decided to reverse, the following language would have been
invoked. "The proof of an ultimate fact may be made in two manners, the one by
direct or, as it is sometimes called, testimonial evidence, and the other by indirect,
or as it is frequently denominated, circumstantial evidence. But it is the rule of law
that while a conclusion as to an ultimate fact may be based upon an inference from
circumstantial evidence, in reaching such conclusion the inference as to the ultimate
fact may not be based on an inference as to the existence of the circumstantial facts."
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. McNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 P.2d 948 (1938). See
also United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 283 (1876). Thus, the no inference on an
inference rule continues to be used "whenever appellate courts find it convenient to
exercise control." MORGAN, MAGUIRE AND WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDXNcE 336 (4th ed. 1957).
202. See text supra at page 15.
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with a fait accompli and the trier of fact must find agency to exist as
a matter of law. Thus, a presumption is a mechanism operative at
trial which relieves the party, upon whom rests the burden of persuasion, of the necessity to introduce evidence of particular facts until
the opponent comes forward with some evidence of his own to rebut
the presumption.
A presumption, therefore, is a mechanism which is operative during the trial of an issue of fact which serves to relieve a proponent of
proving a particular fact until an opponent acts. The purpose of invoking the mechanism, first of all, is based upon the judicial appraisal
of the relative accessibility of proof relevant to the presumed fact. 203
In the instance of agency, the master has proof within his control, and
hence, the proponent is relieved from proof until the master first comes
forward with the proof in his possession. Thus, a presumption is a
mechanism used within the context of the adversary system of litigation
for the purpose of equalizing the contest.
Again, a presumption may serve the function of "proof generator."
For example, when a husband disappears and remains away unheard
from for an extended period of time, his wife is presented with a problem of proof if she is the beneficiary under a life insurance policy payable
upon proof of the husband's death. The problem is simple enough
and the solution is equally simple: upon the introduction of evidence
of continuous absence away from home for seven years, unheard of
by persons who would naturally have received news from the absentee,
the law will create a presumption that the missing person is dead.
Thus, a presumption creates proof, for upon the requisite belief in
such an absence, the trier of fact must find death to be the fact.2 °4
What is more, a presumption may be designed to "promote a determination in accord with the preponderance of probability," 205 where
the basic fact justifies a strong inference toward the presumed fact.
Thus, the law often requires the conclusion, in the event of an un203. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. Rtv.
906, 926 (1931): "Other presumptions have their origin in considerations of the
comparative convenience with which the parties can produce evidence of an issue
of fact." WIGMORt, EvIDENcE 455 (Stud. ed. 1935): ". . . [A]ll burdens and
presumptions are based on experience in trials and on ideas of fairness as between
the parties. .. ."
204. MORGAN, MAGUIRE AND WtINSTUIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDtNCE
441 (4th ed. 1957) : "In some instances the courts have created a presumption in
order to avoid a procedural impasse where evidence of the existence or non-existence
of the presumed fact is lacking. It is now generally held that unexplained absence
for seven years and lack of news . . . raise a presumption of his death."
205. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. Riv. 324, 329
(1952). In this article at this citation is an excellent summary.of Professor Morgan's
classification of the raisons d'etre behind presumptions.
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explained death by violent injury, that the death was not suicidal,
until evidence of self-destruction is offered.20 8
Thus, presumptions are mechanisms used at the trial level which
either create proof, give added incentive to the probability that the
result will be in accord with the usual experience, or which modify
the burden of proof in order to equalize the contest. They serve as
an expedient mechanism used at the trial of an issue of fact to make
adjustments in the burden of proof to fit peculiar situations. But
these are various purposes for the creation of presumptions: they are
not reasons why presumptions should differ in strength one from the
other. If in our agency case, for example, the opponent denies the
presumed fact under oath, the presumption would dissolve as a matter
of law under the Thayer practice. 2° In this event, the proponent is
either without proof, or, if the basic fact is relevant to the presumed
fact, is more likely without enough proof to support a verdict. At this
point, extra-trial considerations of policy may enter the picture and
the law giver may allow the trier of fact to find the presumed fact
to be more probably than not true on the basis that a permissive inference exists between the basic and presumed facts.2"' In a mobile
society realpolitik may dictate that a stronger presumption is necessary
to encourage tighter controls over the use of motor vehicles by nonowners. Thus, while the presumption itself is a mechanism of expedience to facilitate the trial of issues of fact, its strength can be
manipulated in order to achieve social policies which transcend the
trial itself.
7. Certain Observations at Large.
Relative to the varied usage of the concept of presumptions Professor Maguire has observed:
"... This word presumption has suffered badly from rough and
careless handling. It has been used as a synonym for inference
and sometimes as the operative part of weasel-worded formulae
for saying that from the judicial or legislative point of view certain things are taken as true and attempts to contradict them
will be futile. In the former usage the word has often been expanded into the term 'presumption of fact' and in the latter into
'presumption of law' or 'conclusive presumption.' . . . [W]e are
rejecting both these usages and employing presumptions to de206. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir.
1935). But see Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atd. 644 (1934).
207. See text supra at note 78.
208. See text supra at note 147.
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note the concept, illustrated specifically dozens of times in common or statute law, that when a designated basic fact or aggregate of facts exists, existence of another fact or aggregate of
facts, called the presumed fact or facts, must be assumed in the
,,209
absence of adequate rebuttal.
In turn, Professor Laughlin has asserted:
"In checking source material relative to various of the presumptions referred to, it soon becomes evident that the word has been
so promiscuously used as to be devoid of much of its utility. The
language of the law is permeated by 'magic words,' such as the
word res gestae, which are used as substitutes for exact analyses.
The word 'presumption' is rapidly becoming such a word. It has
been used to indicate numerous and unrelated rules of substantive
and procedural law. In most instances its use could be entirely
eliminated without effecting the thought. Courts have too frequently behaved like law students when pushed to solve a particular problem. Instead of analysing they glibly seize upon such
and such a presumption." 210
Thus, in so far as the analysts.are concerned, the term "presumption" has a definite meaning within the legal system. The problem
then becomes threefold. First, the case law over the period of the
last twenty years ought to be examined in order to determine what
the courts are in fact doing. Secondly, on the basis of these cases,
it ought to be possible to see whether the growing awareness of the
"real meaning" of the term presumption, which has been growing in
the analytical circles, is mirrored by a proportionate sense of "real
meaning" within the courts. Lastly, a rationale of presumptions within the context of the working law ought to be formulated.
This last task means nothing more than an attempt to bring order
out of the cases and to establish criteria which take into account the
209.
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183 (1947):

210. Laughlin, In Support of The Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MicH. L.

Rtv. 195, 195-96 (1953).

Professor Laughlin sees "presumption" used in the fol-

lowing senses: (1) as indicating a general disposition of courts, (2) as an authoritative reasoning principle, (3) as a rule of substantive law, (4) as a rule fixing the

burden of persuasion, (5) as a statutory prima facie case, (6) as a permissible inference, (7) as a proposition of judicial notice, and (8) as a rule shifting the burden
of producing evidence. As the title of his article would indicate, he takes the view
that the eighth category is the one distinctive conception of the term presumption.
Professors Morgan and Maguire, on the other hand, have listed four senses in which
the term "presumption" is used: (1) as synonymous with permissible inference,
(2) as establishing a case sufficient to permit the trier of fact to decide that the
presumed fact exists, even though no logical inference of the presumed fact may
be made from the basic fact, (3) as requiring the acceptance of the presumed fact

until certain specified conditions are met, and (4)
rule of substantative law.
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as a conclusive presumption or
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73-75 (3d ed. 1951).
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real differences between the position of the analyst within the sanctuary
of the law school and the judges and lawyers dealing with practical
affairs. For example, in a great many instances the device, presumption, has been used by appellate tribunals where the word "inference"
would more accurately describe the situation. Yet, it goes too far
to say that every case ought to be reversed where there has been an
oversight as to proof of even a minor fact which can safely be inferred
on the basis of judicial experience with similar events. At the other
extreme, the term presumption ought not to become so misunderstood
as to mislead appellate tribunals into such a posture that the distinction
between the function of the judge and the jury is in practice completely
abolished.
Thus it is that our "introduction", has attempted to define the
concept presumption as it "ought to be" and has looked into some of
the actual usages of the term which do not accord with this analysis.
Moreover, we have attempted to delineate what further tasks have yet
to be accomplished in order to arrive at a rational theory of presumptions taken in the context of the law as a whole. Thus, it is hoped, the
reader has been "introduced" to presumptions. Further ratiocination,
however, must await a more expanded treatment.
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